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**POLITICAL CHANGE IN EUROPE AND THE FUTURE OF
UNITED STATES MILITARY PRESENCE IN GERMANY**

by

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**POLITICAL CHANGE IN EUROPE AND THE FUTURE OF UNITED STATES
MILITARY PRESENCE IN GERMANY**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
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ABSTRACT

This thesis analyzes American basing structure in Germany, in a new political environment at the beginning of the 21st century. The end of the Cold War changed the political and strategic situation in Europe and the substance of American military presence in Europe. The War on Terrorism suggests that the current threats are dynamic and unpredictable and the idea of a permanent U.S. basing structure in the heart of Europe should be reconsidered. Specifically, this thesis describes the reasons for restructuring the large and expensive base structure in Germany and the impact of American withdrawal to the German society. Moreover, this thesis presents new challenges and opportunities for American military presence in other parts of European continent. Finally, this thesis reviews the development of U.S. policy concerning present and future base structure in Europe.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

The purpose of this thesis is to propose new structural and political solutions which would help in redeploying the United States bases from Germany into other European countries. This decision seems to be necessary in the new political environment in Europe. New American base structure in Europe should be more efficient, more agile and less expensive than the present one. This thesis examines the main considerations that should guide the United States Department of Defense in the decision to restructure the present base structure in Germany.

This topic is important for three reasons. First, American forces in Germany are not positioned to meet the coming challenges of the 21st century. With the increasing need for operability outside Europe, bases in the heart of unified Germany no longer serve the strategic purpose they did during the Cold War. Second, present American basing structure in Germany is expensive and too large. Instead of spending precious resources on military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) still maintains a complex base structure in Germany with thousands of U.S. soldiers and their families. Third, in the new political environment in Europe, the United States faces serious impediments and difficulties from the German government in realizing the fundamental aims of American foreign policy. Contradictory to the German point of view, Central European countries firmly supporting U.S. policy and would like to host American soldiers.

B. MAJOR QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENTS

This thesis investigates the causes for redeploying and realigning present U.S. military structure in Germany. In addition, this thesis considers the possibility that redeploying American forces from Germany into other European countries may be the first necessary adjustment of the U.S. military in the 21st century. To accomplish this task-that is, gaining a better understanding of the controversy associated with realignment of the U.S. base structure in Germany-four fundamental questions need to be addressed. First, how has the post-Cold War evolution of Europe affected U.S.

perceptions of Germany and its importance to the United States? Second, what are the reasons for realignment of the present U.S. military presence in Germany? Third, what will be the future of American bases in Germany and how will future U.S. bases in Europe look? Lastly, and most importantly, when will this process begin?

To respond to these questions a few major arguments are necessary. After the end of the Cold War, the present American base structure in Germany is no longer efficient. This military configuration was developed to defend against a largely static and predictable enemy-the Soviet Union-during the Cold War era.

In present times, in the shadow of the war on terrorism, the threat environment is dispersed and irregular. The necessity to maintain the large military structure far away from the United States with the housing, schools, and commissaries is difficult and expensive.

In fact, the DoD still has to invest billions of dollars in new facilities in Germany where it already has a presence. The post-Cold War evolution of Europe, expanding of NATO and European Union changed the American perception of Germany and transferred U.S. interest into other regions of Europe.

From the political point of view, American foreign policy is often considered as aggressive and competitive by Western European countries like France and Germany. However, Eastern Europe views United States policy differently. Eastern European countries see American political, economic, and military engagement in Europe as essential for their long-term stability. Therefore, many countries from Eastern Europe are already interested in hosting U.S. troops in their territory.

According to DoD speculations, future American bases in Europe will look differently. The most probable scenario considers much smaller bases in the Eastern part of Europe, closer to potential threats and regions with possible ethnic problems.

The process of redeploying the present U.S. military structure from Germany is closely connected with the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process. The highest U.S. authorities have realized that the decision

is inevitable and is closely linked with the last political events in Europe and American National Security Strategy. The final decision in this matter is a part of the transformation of the U.S. Armed Forces.

C. BACKGROUND

The size of the U.S. Armed Forces in Germany has declined sharply from the height of the Cold War, when hundreds of thousands of American soldiers were stationed in what was then the potential battlefield between the West and East. Today, in unified Germany, there is still a significant number of American soldiers and family members. Including the family housing areas, commissaries, schools and other support facilities, the U.S. Department of Defense serves as landlord to thousands of buildings and installations across the German territory.

However, with the increasing need for operability outside Europe, Berlin is no longer the front-line for future military conflict. America's European basing structure should reflect this reality. Future conflicts are likely to revolve around the Middle East, the Caucasus, and North Africa. In Europe, the Balkans and post-Soviet republics with quasi-democracy still could be considered as politically unstable and unpredictable areas. Establishing forward positions in closer geographical proximity to those regions would demonstrate America's commitment to the long-term security of the region. It would also allow the American Armed Forces to respond rapidly to crises in those regions.

For the United States, the preservation of the current base structure in Germany for operational, strategic, economical and political reasons is becoming more and more difficult. Training has become more difficult in Germany due to rigorous environmental regulations. American bases in the heart of Europe, together with thousands of U.S. soldiers, family members, buildings, installations and other facilities, are too extensive and relatively inefficient. As events from September 11 proved, the strong though regular and permanent base structure in Europe was helpless when the state was confronted with the terrorist threat.

Moreover, the war in Iraq revealed serious political shifts and disturbances within German-American relations. When the Cold War threat

was no longer an issue, the cooperation between two countries was quickly replaced by political competition in the international arena. German opposition towards an American-led war in Iraq could be the best example of different approaches in the area of international security.

In Eastern Europe the situation is different. The further East one travels in Europe, the more pro-American the governments become. After being oppressed by Nazism and communism, Eastern Europeans recall American efforts for those on the wrong side of the Iron Curtain. The strong political support towards U.S. policy in Iraq is the best example of reliability and present strategy of many East European countries. Many states from this part of Europe have already started to make great endeavors towards hosting U.S. troops in future.

Some have argued that moving bases eastward would be prohibitively expensive. However, the United States already maintains an extensive base network in Germany. While there are costs involved, by establishing smaller bases set up for rotational forces in Eastern Europe, the U.S. would not incur the same sort of costs that it takes to build bases for soldiers and their dependents in more expensive parts of the world.

D. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES

This thesis analyzes the historical background of U.S. military presence in Germany since 1945 and the current American policy concerning the base structure in Germany according to the Base Realignment and Closure Process (BRAC). This thesis is primarily based on official American, German and European Union sources, including government publications, journals, reports and documents related to the national security and BRAC process. The realignment of the U.S. base structure is considered as the current topic and final decisions are expecting soon. Therefore, this thesis is also based on Internet articles from the German and American governments and DoD websites. The secondary sources include scholarly analyses, press articles, interviews and speeches.

This thesis is limited to certain aspects and areas of the BRAC process. The legal and institutional questions are reduced to the necessary

minimum; and a number of particular problems, which have important political implications, have not been accounted for or have only been mentioned briefly in this thesis.

E. CHAPTER-BY-CHAPTER SUMMARY

The thesis is organized as follows: Chapter II describes the historical background of the U.S. military presence in Germany since 1945. This includes the development of American position towards Germany according to its national interests and security issues both during and after the Cold War. This chapter also explains the evolution of U.S. military structure in Germany from occupational forces towards the ally forces within the NATO pact. Finally, this chapter characterizes the assessment of American-German bilateral relations and the new challenges for U.S. bases in other parts of Europe. Chapter III provides an analysis of the most important principles for transformation of the present U.S. base structure in Germany. This chapter includes political, strategic, operational and economic considerations important for the final decision concerning redeploying American forces from Germany. Chapter IV offers an analysis of predictable decisions concerning U.S. bases in Germany according to the next round of the BRAC process and estimates the impact of American withdrawal to the German society. This chapter also describes the future model of American bases in Europe, better adapted towards new threats and challenges of the 21st century. The final chapter offers recommendations for the future and provides a summary of the key findings. It analyzes the prospects for the U.S. military presence in Europe according to the new political situation in the world.

F. OUTLINE

Chapter I: Introduction

- A. Statement of purpose
- B. Major questions and arguments
- C. Background
- D. Methodology and sources
- E. Chapter-by-chapter summary

Chapter II: U.S. military bases in Germany and the new political landscape in Europe

- A. U.S. military structure in Germany: from Occupation to Cooperation
- B. U.S. bases in Germany according to American interests in Europe
- C. The war in Iraq and the crisis within U.S.-German relations
- D. Challenges for U.S. military presence in Germany

Chapter III: The most important principles for transformation of present U.S. base structure in Germany

- A. Political concerns
- B. Strategic factors
- C. Operational priorities
- D. Economic considerations

Chapter IV: Restructuring the U.S. military bases in Germany

- A. U.S. bases in Germany and Base Realignment and Closure process
- B. The impact of an American withdrawal on the German society
- C. The future model of U.S. military bases in Europe

Chapter V: Conclusions

- A. Implications for the future

II. U.S. MILITARY BASES IN GERMANY AND THE NEW POLITICAL LANDSCAPE IN EUROPE

A. U.S. MILITARY STRUCTURE IN GERMANY: FROM OCCUPATION TO COOPERATION

After the final defeat of Nazi Germany in May 1945, the triumphant Allied Forces divided Germany into four military sectors, each of them administered by one of the main allied partners-the United States, England, France, and the Soviet Union.¹ The U.S. forces took control of the Southern and Central-Western part of Germany, today's federal states of Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg and Hesse.² The strictly enforced Western occupation zones would not last long. However, they continued to dominate the base structure and positioning of the Allied Forces throughout the Cold War and almost to present day.

Growing tension between the Soviet Union and the other Allied Forces quickly dominated post-war policies in Germany. Fear of assault on both sides of the Cold War border helped in the evolution of the role of foreign forces in Germany from one of occupation to one of protection. To guard against the possible ultimate threat, the United States continued to maintain a large military presence in subordinated zones long after the situation in Germany was secured.

In 1947 and 1948, the battle over the fate of postwar Europe was becoming more worrying.³ With America's announcement of the Truman Doctrine, the introduction of the Marshall Plan, and impending merger of the Western zones of Germany into a single republic, Berlin became the flash point of the Cold War.⁴

As relations hardened between the Cold War adversaries, Germany became the primary potential battlefield for World War III and U.S. troop levels

¹ Keith B. Cunningham and Andreas Klemmer, "Restructuring the U.S. Military Bases in Germany, Scope, Impacts, and Opportunities," Bonn International Center for Conversion, report 4 (June 1995), 10.

² Ibid.

³ Richard Pells, *Not Like Us, How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture Since World War II* (New York: Basic Books, 1997), 47.

⁴ Ibid.

tripled from 1950 to 1953.⁵ Every year for nearly four decades, one-quarter of a million troops were stationed in West Germany until 1993, when the number of U.S. soldiers dropped to 105,254.⁶

In 1949, with the support of the Western Allies, a new West German government was created.⁷ West German government lacked the necessary independence to negotiate with the Allied commanders, and was in affect told to lease the ground and installations 'required for defense purposes' without any financial compensation.⁸ Furthermore, the German government paid all costs associated with re-building, maintaining, and establishing bases for the Allied Forces during this time as part of reparation transfers.⁹

In addition to facilities in their own sector, the U.S. Armed Forces took over a number of strategic locations in the federal state of Rhineland-Palatinate from the French forces.¹⁰ Also during this time, the United States established strategic positions in the former British areas of Bremerhaven-in support of the Northern city's important port facilities and in North Rhine-Westphalia in support of the nearby Netherlands Military Community.¹¹

West Germany completed its evolution to a Western ally in 1955 by establishing itself as a sovereign democratic nation and by joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).¹² Membership in NATO canceled out the previous basing agreement between West Germany and the Allied Forces; instead, the bases had to meet the terms of NATO statutes governing troop deployments in a Member State.¹³ Since that moment, the United

⁵ Tim Kane, "Global U.S. Troop Deployment, 1950-2003," *The Heritage Foundation*, 27 October 2004; available from <http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/cda04-11.cfm>; Internet; accessed 28 February 2005.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Keith B. Cunningham and Andreas Klemmer, "Restructuring the U.S. Military Bases in Germany, 10.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid, 10-11.

States began paying all expenses to maintain, improve, or establish bases in West Germany; as compensation, West Germany agreed to lease the land to U.S. Forces for free.¹⁴

Once moved into their strategic position after World War II, both Cold War sides respected the status quo for almost 50 years. On October 3, 1990, Germany was reunified.¹⁵ The Cold War front-line protected by seven countries was eliminated. The international security system in Europe was dramatically changed. Also on that date, the new all-German national government became fully independent, allowing Germany the power to review regulations governing stationing of foreign troops on its soil. Presently, Germany remains interested in hosting NATO troop deployments indefinitely.

In spite of the continued strength of the NATO alliance, the burden of supporting more than a million soldiers on German soil became unbearable—not only for the United States, but also for the reunified German state. As a result, the U.S. has dramatically reduced their troop deployments in Germany.

Consequently, between January 1990 and February 1995, the U.S. Department of Defense announced twenty rounds of overseas base closures.¹⁶ The operation of the 953 installations has been ended, reduced or placed on a standby status; eighteen of those rounds affected 636 installation sites in Germany.¹⁷ The majority of the U.S. installations involved in the redeploying process have been Army facilities (556 sites), while 80 sites belonged to the U.S. Air Force Bases.¹⁸ During this period, the U.S. Army abandoned some of the most powerful symbols of the Cold War, including Check Point Charlie, as well as the rest of its 42 Berlin facilities, all three Fulda border observation points and other holdings in that strategically important passage.¹⁹

¹⁴ Keith B. Cunningham and Andreas Klemmer, "Restructuring the U.S. Military Bases in Germany, 11.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid., 17.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

The level of U.S. Army personnel in Germany has been reduced from 210,000 in 1989 to approximately 82,000 in 1995.²⁰ In 2000, just 69,203 American military personnel remained in Germany.²¹

The U.S. Army disbanded 40 percent of its Military Communities; in the meantime, no Military Community was able to avoid reductions.²² The U.S. Air Force cut more aggressively in the early rounds than did the Army. From 1990 to 1994, the United States withdrew approximately 28,500 Air Force soldiers and civilians, marking a significant 60 percent reduction.²³

Today, in Germany, there are still a considerable number of U.S. troops. In 2003, according to the *German Information Center*, more than 100,000 military personnel and their families were at home at U.S. bases on German soil.²⁴ The Ramstein/Landstuhl/Kaiserslautern Military Community with 34,000 American residents, is the largest American community outside of the United States.²⁵ Together with the Kaiserslautern, there are nine main American Military Communities in Germany. The others include the following: Grafenwoehr/Hohenfels (24,500 personnel and family), Heidelberg (16,000), Spangdahlem (12,000), Schweinfurt (12,000), Stuttgart (10,800), Wiesbaden (5,500), Coleman/Mannheim (5,000), Geilenkirchen (3,000).²⁶ The large number of U.S. troops in Germany was not only part of a military plan, it was also an element of wider American policy towards Europe.

²⁰ Keith B. Cunningham and Andreas Klemmer, "Restructuring the U.S. Military Bases in Germany, 20.

²¹ Tim Kane, "Global U.S. Troop Deployment, 1950-2003."

²² Keith B. Cunningham and Andreas Klemmer, "Restructuring the U.S. Military Bases in Germany, 20.

²³ Ibid., 22.

²⁴ German Embassy Washington D.C., *Fact Sheet: American Bases in Germany* [database on line]; available from http://www.germany-info.org/relaunch/info/publications/infocus/bases/American-bases_in_Germany_fs.pdf; Internet; accessed 20 December 2004.

²⁵ German Embassy Washington D.C., *Fact Sheet: American Bases in Germany*.

²⁶ Ibid.

B. U.S. BASES IN GERMANY ACCORDING TO AMERICAN INTERESTS IN EUROPE

For the majority of Western Europeans during and after World War II, America's foreign policy and its culture were personified by the American army.²⁷ It is impossible to consider the defense posture of American forces in Europe without analyzing their dominant position in Germany, which was split in half by post-1945 occupations of Soviets in the East and the other Allies in the West.

In the beginning, the mission of the U.S. military was to secure and control their part of the country. To fulfill this task, they maintained a widespread system of installations in the sector. In many cases, the American troops commandeered former German bases for their own use. These bases were generally located near city centers and industrial facilities. Without any formal government to object, the United States simply assumed ownership of the installations and other facilities considered necessary.²⁸

Because of the original 1945 occupation zone, approximately 94 percent of U.S. civilian and military personnel were still located in the Southern and Southwestern German federal states of Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg, Hesse and Rhineland-palatinate.²⁹ Within that region, the United States divided its Army bases and personnel between two lines of defense.³⁰ The first line was located out along Southern sections of the inner-German front line, with its strategic center at the Fulda Gap.³¹ Further Army units were stationed in Southwestern Rhineland-Palatinate, westwards from the river Rhine, and in close proximity to the border with France and Luxembourg.³² Mainly, these bases created the Northern flank of the second line of defense and protected the six U.S. Air Bases (Bitburg, Hahn,

²⁷ Richard Pells, *Not Like Us*, 40.

²⁸ Keith B. Cunningham and Andreas Klemmer, "Restructuring the U.S. Military Bases in Germany, 10.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 12.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² *Ibid.*

Ramstein, Sembach, Spangdahlem and Zweibrücken), which were concentrated in the relatively small state of Rhineland-Palatinate.³³

U.S. bases in Germany were also the most important part of the American strategy towards Europe. Of all the cultural missions undertaken in Europe by the American government after World War II, none was bigger or more ambitious than the attempt to create within its own zone of occupation an entirely new Germany.³⁴ Between 1945 and 1949 Germany was exhausted and in need of every conceivable form of assistance; the American army controlled the whole population and Washington could presumably accomplish whatever it wanted.³⁵ It was a great opportunity for political reform, social engineering, and cultural transformation all of which would serve the interests both of America's democratic ideals and its postwar foreign policy.³⁶

To convert the Germans in the American zone from beggars to partners, the United States had to help re-establish the economic and cultural infrastructure. In June 1947, at Harvard University, in one of the most famous inauguration speeches ever given, Secretary of State George Marshall announced America's willingness to help Europe in postwar recovery.³⁷ Germany was the most important element of the American financial and recovery plan.

The attempt to restore West Germany according to American specifications, and to secure its loyalty in the predictable confrontation with the Soviet Union, was not just an experiment designed for one country. It was an element of a much grander strategy, increasingly called the Atlantic Community.³⁸ According to President Dwight Eisenhower;

Properly speaking the stationing of U.S. divisions in Europe had been at the outset an emergency measure not intended to last

³³ Keith B. Cunningham and Andreas Klemmer, "Restructuring the U.S. Military Bases in Germany, 12.

³⁴ Richard Pells, *Not Like Us*, 41.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid., 53.

³⁸ Ibid.

indefinitely. Unhappily, however, the European nations have been slow in building up their military forces and have now come to expect our forces to remain in Europe indefinitely.³⁹

With the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in April 1949, the United States and Germany formally became military allies.⁴⁰ It was the turning point for two previously antagonistic countries. For the first time, the United States had signed on to a permanent alliance that linked it to Europe's defense. For Germany, participation in NATO signaled a new acceptance abroad and an important political legitimacy. The strong tie remained solid throughout the turbulent years of the Cold War. German leaders from Konrad Adenauer to Helmut Kohl remained determinedly pro-American in their outlook.⁴¹

When the Iron Curtain finally came down in the fall of 1989, the United States was Germany's leading supporter in the drive for reunification.⁴² While European countries such as Britain, France, Italy, and Poland considered the unification of Germany as a potential threat, the administration of President George H.W. Bush considered united Germany as the anchor for post-Cold War Europe.⁴³ The United States was the sole original World War II victor actively and consequently supporting its unification.⁴⁴

Today, America still has many interests in Europe. These include expanding democracy, keeping European markets open to American goods and ideas, preventing the domination of the continent by hostile powers and avoiding major wars.⁴⁵ To ensure that these interests are protected, America will have to participate in creating the new expanded Europe, or risk losing

³⁹ Kim R. Holmes and Jay P. Kosminsky, eds., *Reshaping Europe: Strategies for a Post-Cold War Europe* (Washington D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1990), 201.

⁴⁰ Dr. Nile Gardiner and Helle Dale, "What Berlin Must Do to Repair the U.S.-German Alliance," *The Heritage Foundation*, 30 October 2002; available from <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/BG1609.cfm> ; Internet; accessed 19 February 2005.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Kim R. Holmes and Jay P. Kosminsky, eds., *Reshaping Europe*, 183.

Washington's ability to influence events. Without U.S. bases in Germany, the American influence in the European continent would be less efficient.

According to Karsten D. Voigt, the Coordinator for German-American Relations:

...Germany remains the largest U.S. stationing location in Europe. At the same time, the Americans will use their bases in Europe, especially in Germany, not to defend against enemies in Europe -for they no longer exist-but rather to have highly mobile units here. New units will come here which are intended for operations outside or on the periphery of Europe.⁴⁶

C. THE WAR IN IRAQ AND THE CRISIS WITHIN U.S.-GERMAN RELATIONS

The policy of President George W. Bush in Iraq has been a litmus test in present U.S.-German relations. It was also the symbol of the new era and different political climate between two previously closely related countries. During the Cold War, Germany lived and grew stronger under the umbrella of American forces. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and unification of the whole nation, Germany wanted to be an independent actor in the political arena.

Since the very beginning, the German approach towards the war in Iraq was unequivocally pessimistic. Despite the fact that during the Cold War transatlantic partnership has been one of the basic trends of German foreign policy, Berlin has ruled out military participation in the Iraq war.⁴⁷ Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder has stated indisputably that Germany will not participate in U.S.-led military action to remove Saddam Hussein from power.⁴⁸

However, despite of the negative, anti-war German approach, on March 19, 2003, the invasion of Iraq began.⁴⁹ Contrasting to broad Western-Arab coalition during the first Gulf War, this time approximately 99 percent of

⁴⁶ German Embassy Washington D.C., *German-U.S. Relations* [database on line]; available from http://www.germany-info.org/relaunch/info/publications/infocus/bases/American-bases_in_Germany_fs.pdf; Internet; accessed 27 February 2005.

⁴⁷ Dr. Nile Gardiner and Helle Dale, "What Berlin Must Do to Repair the U.S.-German Alliance."

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Elizabeth Pond, *Friendly Fire, The Near Death of the Transatlantic Alliance* (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: European Union Studies Association, 2004), 74.

the expeditionary force was American and British, plus one Danish submarine and two hundred Polish soldiers; critics referred to the alliance as the “coalition of the bought.”⁵⁰

Nevertheless, once again the U.S. military proved extraordinary efficient. Precision weapons worked as well as they had in Afghanistan. American commandos got to the oilfields fast enough to prevent their being set ablaze en masse as in 1991. There was no nightmare of house-to-house bloody fighting. The worst-case scenarios did not happen. Even without significant involvement of American ground troops from the North Saddam Hussein was defeated in a swift, three-week march on Baghdad.⁵¹

However, according to George Kennan, “...Anyone who has studied history knows that you might start the war with certain thing in your mind, but you end up fighting for things never thought of before.” The preparation and the procession of the war against Iraq sparked things off within the NATO Alliance.⁵² The operation was planned without the cooperation of NATO bodies and with the participation of only Britain.⁵³ More importantly, the war was conducted without the United Nations endorsement and despite negative opinion from the key transatlantic partners: Germany and France.

America started the war in Iraq, and along the way, had fewer allies and more enemies. On the eve of the Iraq war, favorable opinion about the United States plunged from 63 percent in mid-2002 to 31 percent in France, from 61 percent to 25 percent in Germany, and from 70 percent to 34 percent in Italy.⁵⁴ However, the U.S. administration still held that those who were not with the United States were against them, and blamed the transatlantic breach of 2003 exclusively on French insolence and German ingratitude.⁵⁵

The failure of creating a coalition with Europeans forced the United States to reevaluate their transatlantic alliance. U.S. Defense Secretary

⁵⁰ Elizabeth Pond, *Friendly Fire*, 74.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Gustav Lindstrom et al., eds., *Shift or Rift, Assessing US-EU relations after Iraq* (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2003), 15.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Elizabeth Pond, *Friendly Fire*, 93.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

Donald Rumsfeld dismissed Germany and France as the “old Europe” and praised the “new Europe,” which consisted of countries that backed the United States.⁵⁶ In Washington, “old Europe,” with Germany as the main actor, was seen as incapable of mounting a major military operation. The overthrowing of Saddam Hussein, occupation of Iraq, and the challenges of postwar reconstruction provided a new context for the transatlantic ties as well as for U.S.–German relations.

From the beginning, the Chancellor Schroeder cast doubt on the reliability of evidence regarding Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, and observed that the threat posed by Saddam Hussein “may be overestimated” by President Bush’s senior advisers.⁵⁷ Schroeder’s challenger during the elections, Edmund Stoiber, even said he would refuse to let the United States use Germany as its staging ground for any unilateral war on Iraq.⁵⁸ In reference to Germany’s \$9 billion contribution to fund the Gulf War, Schroeder informed, “the time of cheque book diplomacy is over once and for all.”⁵⁹

German criticism of U.S. plans for Iraq sometimes descended into clearly anti-American polemic. According to Ludwig Stiegler, the Social Democrat’s parliamentary leader, President Bush acted like a Roman dictator, “as if he were Caesar Augustus and Germany were his province Germania.”⁶⁰ Stiegler also compared the U.S. Ambassador Daniel R. Coates, to Pyotr Abrassimov, the disliked Soviet Ambassador to East Germany prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall.⁶¹

In German press, anti-American opinions were even more straightforward. Schroeder’s former Justice Minister Herta Daeubler-Gmelin compared President Bush’s policy towards Iraq with that of Hitler’s strategy

⁵⁶ Elizabeth Pond, *Friendly Fire*, 68.

⁵⁷ Dr. Nile Gardiner and Helle Dale, “What Berlin Must Do to Repair the U.S.-German Alliance.”

⁵⁸ Elizabeth Pond, *Friendly Fire*, 57.

⁵⁹ Dr. Nile Gardiner and Helle Dale, “What Berlin Must Do to Repair the U.S.-German Alliance.”

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid.

before World War II.⁶² In the local German newspaper, *Schwabisches Tagblatt* stated “Bush wants to divert attention from his domestic problems. It is a classic tactic. It’s one that Hitler also used.”⁶³ Former Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping accused President Bush of wishing to remove Saddam Hussein in order to placate “a powerful-perhaps overly powerful-Jewish lobby.”⁶⁴

These statements sharpened the American reaction towards Germany. From the American point of view; Germany was rehabilitated and rebuilt with U.S. help, protected from the Soviet Union by U.S. willingness to fight a Third World War in its defense, and finally, unified thanks to American steadfastness when others doubted.⁶⁵

Today, the prevailing American feeling about Germany is one of disillusionment and disappointment.⁶⁶ U.S. animosity towards France might be stronger, but disappointment with Germany may be more far-reaching. U.S.-German crises is by definition crises in the transatlantic alliance, which Americans have always seen Germany anchoring on the European side.⁶⁷ NATO has survived many Franco-American storms but never an open German break with the United States on something as significant as a decision to use force.⁶⁸

In Washington, it was assumed that the fast U.S. military triumph in Iraq would show Europeans that they had been wrong to be so timorous about the war.⁶⁹ In addition, even if they did not confess the error of their ways, Europeans would now have to adjust to the world as America had remade it.⁷⁰ The proper way to deal with European malcontents, in the words

⁶² Dr. Nile Gardiner and Helle Dale, “What Berlin Must Do to Repair the U.S.-German Alliance.”

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Gustav Lindstrom et al., eds., *Shift or Rift*, 46-47.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 46.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Elizabeth Pond, *Friendly Fire*, 81.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

attributed to Condoleezza Rice, was to forgive the Russians, ignore the Germans, and punish the French.⁷¹

Recently, the sharp differences within transatlantic relations, most evident in German opposition to U.S. unilateralism, have receded. The Coordinator for German-American Relations, Karsten D. Voigt mentioned that:

...Overall, German-American relations remain exceptionally close and very important; both in the military and diplomatic sphere, but are characterized by the fact that either Germans and Americans together or the Americans alone will now protect Europe from threats emanating from outside Europe.⁷²

The Bush administration has adopted a multilateral perspective with the help of the UN and its NATO and EU allies. Nevertheless, the tensions between unilateral and multilateral attitudes evident in the crisis of 2002-03 are still not fading. That crisis revealed a serious clash of values concerning the legitimate use of military force in world politics-a clash rooted in different political institutions and historical narratives on both sides of the Atlantic.⁷³

The war in Iraq revealed, in the clearest manner imaginable, both what had changed and what remained constant within the transatlantic alliance.⁷⁴ The most important change, however, was America's concept of international relations and foreign policy. The priority on transatlantic matters that characterized American foreign policy during the Cold War no longer exists. The American area of interest is transferring from the Cold War border in Germany into other trouble spots in the world, particularly in the Middle East and West Asia.

D. CHALLENGES FOR U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN GERMANY

The political split during the war in Iraq revealed different approaches towards the United States within European nations. Contradictory to the hesitance of Germany, Eastern Europe already started the competition for the

⁷¹ Elizabeth Pond, *Friendly Fire*, 81.

⁷² German Embassy Washington D.C., German-U.S. Relations.

⁷³ Thomas Banchoff, "Unilateralism, Value Conflict, and Transatlantic Tensions," *American Institute for Contemporary German Studies*, available from <http://www.aicgs.org/c/banchoffc.shtml>; Internet; accessed 15 February 2005.

⁷⁴ Gustav Lindstrom et al., eds., *Shift or Rift*, 13.

privilege of hosting U.S. military bases in its territory. For the majority of Eastern European countries, future military cooperation with the U.S. is the primary political objective.

Redeploying and opening new bases is a serious and costly enterprise. However, despite of the significant cost involved, in Eastern Europe there are plenty of Soviet-era bases; and while most would require significant improvements, some countries are already modernizing their bases. For example, Romania and Bulgaria are currently upgrading bases in Constanza and Burgas under the terms of the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP).⁷⁵ Moreover, Bulgaria offers Black Sea access with its ports of Varna and Burgas, and air bases such as Dobritch in the Northeast and Kroumovo in the South.⁷⁶ The Taszar air base in Hungary, which was used by U.S. forces to conduct operations in the Balkans, could be upgraded and adapted for American needs.⁷⁷ The Czech Republic, as well as other countries, offers a variety of basing prospects.

Of the many potential locations, Poland has several attractive opportunities for U.S. military bases in the future. Strong and consistent support from Warsaw for American policy during the Iraq crisis is an important indication of its desire to strengthen its strategic partnership with Washington. During the negotiating talks concerning access into the European Union, despite the different opinion of France and Germany, Polish government unambiguously supported American military plans towards Iraq. Warsaw not only publicly backed the U.S. intervention—a move that put it at odds with many West European members of NATO, but also sent a combat unit to Iraq.⁷⁸ Moreover, the Polish government decided to send 2,500 soldiers into

⁷⁵ Jack Spencer and John C. Hulsman, PhD, "Restructuring America's European Base Structure for the New Era," *The Heritage Foundation*, 28 April 2003; available from <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/bgl648.cfm>; Internet; accessed 19 December 2004.

⁷⁶ Jack Spencer and John C. Hulsman, PhD, "Restructuring America's European Base Structure for the New Era."

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ F. Stephen Larrabee, "NATO's Eastern Agenda in a New Strategic Era," *RAND*, available from <http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1744/MR1744.pdf>; Internet; accessed 6 February 2005.

Iraq after the war, and agreed to take responsibility for one of the three peacekeeping zones in Iraq after Saddam Hussein's defeat.⁷⁹

Strong alliance with the U.S. is a significant part of the Polish national strategy. According to Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz:

Poland understands the US intentions... particularly the right to self-defense against the threat that showed its apocalyptic countenance on September 11. The struggle for freedom and democracy of our people-but also of other nations-has long traditions in Polish political culture, so it is natural that we feel an affinity for the mission undertaken by our great Trans-Atlantic partner.⁸⁰

The political-military relations with the U.S. are an important part of the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland:

Active and close political and military contacts with U.S., strengthened by cooperation in the framework of military action and stabilization operation in Iraq, are the part of significant achievement of Polish security policy.⁸¹

U.S. government officials also noticed a reliable Polish military approach. According to Bob Hall, the Pentagon's NATO liaison during the Clinton administration,

The Poles have got a very strong military tradition...One of the great values of having them in the alliance is they are forward-leaning on a lot of these operations, while the Western countries are less so.⁸²

According to *RAND* specialists, within the Czech Republic and Hungary, Poland's military performance has been the best of these three NATO members.⁸³ Poland provided significantly more political and military support to the campaign in Kosovo than did Hungary or the Czech Republic-

⁷⁹ F. Stephen Larrabee, "NATO's Eastern Agenda in a New Strategic Era."

⁸⁰ *Polish Delegation to NATO* [database on-line], available from <http://www.nato.int/poland/homeen.html>; Internet, accessed 6 February 2005.

⁸¹ *Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej* [database on-line], available from <http://www.mon.gov.pl>; Internet, accessed 6 February 2005.

⁸² F. Stephen Larrabee, "NATO's Eastern Agenda in a New Strategic Era."

⁸³ *Ibid.*

even offering publicly to send combat troops.⁸⁴ Poland has also been willing to send troops for peacekeeping missions not only to Europe and Iraq, but also to far areas such as Haiti and Afghanistan.

Poland's desire to maintain a close strategic partnership with the United States can further be seen in its decision to purchase the U.S. built *F-16* instead of the British-Swedish *Gripen* or French *Mirage*.⁸⁵ Thanks to the purchase of 48 multi-role *F-16* airplanes, manufactured by the American corporation *Lockheed Martin*, offset has become an important issue in the Polish media.⁸⁶ According to Polish law, every contract exceeding 5 million euros has to be compensated with investment in the Polish industry of a value at least equal to that of the concluded contract.⁸⁷ *Lockheed Martin* has the next 10 years to meet its offset responsibilities.⁸⁸ During the first three years, firms from the U.S. should become involved in projects estimated at \$3 billion, in the following three years, \$2 billion, and during the final four years, \$1 billion.⁸⁹

Poland is also attractive to U.S. officials because of its military infrastructure modernization plans. In 2004, NATO invested 1.2 billion PLN (est. \$0.4 billion) in Poland for infrastructure.⁹⁰ The total value of its investment program is 2.5 billion PLN (est. \$0.75 billion).⁹¹ By joining NATO, Poland committed itself to adapting its armed forces and military infrastructure to the organization's standards. This includes the redevelopment of air and naval bases as well as development an air defense system. In 2004, for the first time, NATO's investment was significantly higher than Poland's own contribution to its development in infrastructure.⁹²

⁸⁴ F. Stephen Larrabee, "NATO's Eastern Agenda in a New Strategic Era."

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ "The State of Arms," *Warsaw Voice*, 26 May 2004, available from <http://www.warsawvoice.pl/thepolishvoice/5734>; Internet; accessed 6 February 2005.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ "NATO-An Important Investor in Poland", *Warsaw Voice*, 20 October 2004, available from <http://www.warsawvoice.pl/view/6799>; Internet; accessed 6 February 2005.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² "NATO-An Important Investor in Poland", *Warsaw Voice*.

Modernization of Polish airfields, naval bases and command centers is rapidly progressing. It is necessary due to potential dangers that could require the deployment of NATO troops in Poland. The construction and modernization of Polish army bases, carried out by NATO, involves seven airfields, two seaports, five fuel depots, six radar stations, four air defense command points, and a naval vessel guidance center.⁹³

Starting in January 2004, and continuing throughout recent months, the Polish media has carried reports about the possibility of establishing U.S. military bases in Poland. From the Polish point of view, the military airfields in Powidz near Gniezno, Krzesin near Poznań, and Łask near Łódź are being mentioned as the most probable locations for potential U.S. Army bases.⁹⁴ These airfields could host complete facilities needed for the stationing and exercises of the U.S. Army.

It is also probable that the Polish government will propose that Americans could establish a permanent training center in Drawsko Pomorskie, which has been available for maneuvers for years and has been regularly used by NATO troops.⁹⁵ Additionally, according to the *Gazeta Wyborcza* daily, Polish government suggested using some of their domestic Army bases as a new place for U.S. logistics or training purposes.⁹⁶

Moreover, Warsaw already supported President Bush's plans for missile defense and has indicated willingness to serve as a site for a missile defense system for Central Europe. According to the *Gazeta Wyborcza* daily, Washington has conducted top-secret talks with Warsaw about installing one or two missile defense radars in Poland.⁹⁷

Finally, the majority of Eastern European countries, "new Europe" according to U.S. officials, are willing to host U.S. troops in their territory.

⁹³ "NATO-An Important Investor in Poland", *Warsaw Voice*.

⁹⁴ "U.S. Army Bases in Poland?", *Warsaw Voice*, 21 January 2004, available from <http://www.warsawvoice.pl/view/4556>, Internet, accessed 9 January 2005.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Bartosz Węglarczyk, "Czy mamy bać się wyjścia USA?", *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 18 August 2004, 7.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

From the political and economical point of view, the pressure from Eastern European countries might be a serious challenge for the present location of U.S. forces in Germany.

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III. THE MOST IMPORTANT PRINCIPLES FOR TRANSFORMATION PRESENT U.S. BASE STRUCTURE IN GERMANY

A. POLITICAL CONCERNS

To be more consistent with the realities of today's threats, the United States should redefine its current political alliances. Restructuring the current American base structure in Germany must advance political interest of both the U.S. and its allies.

Generally, the further East one travels in Europe, the more pro-American the governments become.⁹⁸ All of these governments had displayed solidarity with the United States despite concerns that this support could jeopardize their entry into the European Union.⁹⁹ Eastern Europeans recall very positively American efforts for those on the wrong side of the Iron Curtain during the Cold War. After being oppressed by Nazism and communism, they see American political, economical and military commitment as essential to long-term stability in the region. From the historical point of view, only the United States could be the guarantee of peace and stability in this part of Europe. Therefore, many European countries are still ready, willing and able to support the United States in its hour of need. The series of letters proclaiming support for the action of the United States in Iraq proved the existence of a strong pro-American front in Europe.¹⁰⁰ In fact, all the Central European countries stayed with the U.S. against what they considered as a Franco-German attempt to rally the European Union against the Americans and split NATO.¹⁰¹

⁹⁸ Jack Spencer and John C. Hulsman, PhD, "Restructuring America's European Base Structure for the New Era."

⁹⁹ Janusz Bugajski and Ilona Teleki, Washington's New European Allies: Durable or Conditional Partners? *The Washington Quarterly*, available from http://www.twq.com/05spring/docs/05spring_bugajski.pdf, Internet, accessed 16 May 2005.

¹⁰⁰ The first of these letters was published in The Wall Street Journal on January 20, 2003, and was signed by the leaders of Spain, Portugal, Italy the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Denmark; the second was signed by Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

¹⁰¹ Andreas Maurer, Kai-Olaf Lang and Eugene Whitlock, eds. "New Stimulus or Integration Backlash? EU Enlargement and Transatlantic Relations," Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik-German Institute for International and Security Affairs, July 2004, 52.

Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder's opposition to an American-led war in Iraq could be the best example of present Western European foreign policy. In part, there is a matter of consistent European multilateral approach versus unilateral American attitude. Europe wants to strengthen the international institutions and maintain the peace by diplomatic means. On the other side of the Atlantic, international organizations are perceived as inefficient. For the United States, the best defense is a good offense, and will do it alone, if necessary.

During the operation in Iraq, certain members of the German parliament even tried to limit American use of German airspace.¹⁰² If it had succeeded, it would have severely hampered U.S. operations. It was only by accident, however, that they very significantly threatened America's ability to act decisively and quickly during the emergency hour.

The political reaction of the Eastern European countries during the Iraq crises was different. According to U.S. Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, months ago, the Prime Minister of Estonia told President Bush that he did not need an explanation of the need to confront Iraq.¹⁰³ Because the great democracies failed to act in the 1930s, his people, and the whole country, lived in slavery for 50 years.¹⁰⁴ Many Eastern European countries would express the same opinion. Countries like Bulgaria and Romania opened their airspace unconditionally and offered use of their land and seaports to U.S. forces during the Afghanistan conflict.¹⁰⁵

Throughout the Iraq crisis, Europeans also appeared divided within the United Nations Security Council, with Germany siding with France (and Russia), and Spain and Bulgaria with Britain.¹⁰⁶ This dramatic split was

¹⁰² Jack Spencer and John C. Hulsman, PhD, "Restructuring America's European Base Structure for the New Era."

¹⁰³ Condoleezza Rice, "Our Coalition," WSJ.com Opinion Journal from *The Wall Street Journal* Editorial Page, 26 March 2003, available from <http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110003248>; Internet; accessed 15 January 2005.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Jack Spencer and John C. Hulsman, PhD, "Restructuring America's European Base Structure for the New Era."

¹⁰⁶ Andreas Maurer, Kai-Olaf Lang and Eugene Whitlock, eds. "New Stimulus or Integration Backlash?" , 52.

followed by Poland's decision to fight the Iraq war as the only other actual European "belligerent" country alongside the United Kingdom.¹⁰⁷

Poland went one step further in supporting the United States in comparison with other Eastern European states. During the war, Polish Special Forces secured a key oil platform in the Gulf.¹⁰⁸ Once the war was over, a Polish contingent took direct military control of a limited region in South-Central Iraq, with some assistance from NATO's SHAPE and financial support from Washington.¹⁰⁹ With the exception of Poland, within the forty-eight Iraq-coalition members in 2005, there are many Eastern European countries including: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine.¹¹⁰

As U.S. military relations with old-line NATO allies grow more remote and attenuated, the Pentagon is benefiting from closer ties with Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic.¹¹¹ "It's the Eastern European countries that are desperate to have a relationship with the United States," said retired U.S. Army Gen. Wesley Clark, the former supreme allied commander in Europe.¹¹² "They understand how difficult it is for the [Western] Europeans to do anything. They know it is the Americans that make things happen. They trust us."¹¹³

According to a controversial, yet significant, statement by the U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Germany and France do not represent Europe.¹¹⁴ "I think that's old Europe," Rumsfeld said, "If you look at the entire NATO Europe today, the center of gravity is shifting to the East. And there are

¹⁰⁷ Andreas Maurer, Kai-Olaf Lang and Eugene Whitlock, eds. "New Stimulus or Integration Backlash?" , 52.

¹⁰⁸ Condoleezza Rice, "Our Coalition."

¹⁰⁹ Andreas Maurer, Kai-Olaf Lang and Eugene Whitlock, eds. "New Stimulus or Integration Backlash?" , 52.

¹¹⁰ *White House* [database on-line], accessed 15 January 2005; available from: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030321-4.html>; Internet.

¹¹¹ Vernon Loeb, "U.S. Looks Eastward in New NATO."

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Steven Komarrow, "Ex-Warsaw pact nations now key to U.S.," *USA Today*, 3 February 2003; available from: <http://209.157.64.200/focus/f-news/835302/posts>; Internet; accessed 15 January 2005.

a lot of new members.”¹¹⁵ According to the other American security analyst, Nile Gardiner, from the *Heritage Foundation*, “France and Germany are declining powers on the international stage with no real influence...I see the nations of Eastern and Central Europe following (Rumsfeld’s lead).”¹¹⁶

From the one side, these kinds of statements are unjustified and expressed during moments of political tensions. From the other side, however, they revealed the present political climate between the U.S. and Germany.

B. STRATEGIC FACTORS

The other important principle for the transformation of present U.S. base structure in Germany is advancing America’s strategic objectives. Those objectives include nurturing existing alliances and friendship cooperation, preventing a hostile power from dominating Europe or the Middle East, and ensuring access to regional natural resources.¹¹⁷ To fulfill this task, the United States should increase strategic flexibility and strengthen regional stability.

Military bases in the heart of Germany no longer can serve the strategic purpose they did during the Cold War. According to national security analysts, future conflicts will emerge around the Caucasus, Iraq, the Middle East, and North Africa.¹¹⁸ Therefore, redeploying bases from Germany to the closer geographical proximity to those regions would allow the U.S. to respond rapidly to potential crises. Moreover, the United States could guarantee long-term stability in those regions and would shift their own military forces closer to the strategically important areas.

According to Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas J. Feith:

We have found that we’ve engaged in military operations over last dozen years or so in places where nobody anticipated

¹¹⁵ Steven Komarrow, “Ex-Warsaw pact nations now key to U.S.”

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Jack Spencer and John C. Hulsman, PhD, “Restructuring America’s European Base Structure for the New Era.”

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

engaging in military operations...And it is clear that one of the most important phenomena in the world today is uncertainty.¹¹⁹

Feith also explained that the U.S. military will focus not only within regions, but also across regions: "...the idea that we have forces, for example, in Europe that are going to fight in Europe or forces on the Korean peninsula that are dedicated to Korean contingencies, is no longer our thought."¹²⁰ U.S. forces must be positioned around the world in completely new regions, so they can respond to future events. According to Douglas J. Feith:

We do not believe that we know where we might have to do military operations...We therefore cannot be confident that we are based where we're going to fight. And for that reason, we need to have a force posture that allows for flexibility.¹²¹

Restructuring and redeploying present U.S. base structure in Germany would increase American geographical flexibility. At this time, the United States is too dependent on a few countries. For example, U.S. troops that deployed to Iraq have to wait for permission from the Austrian government to cross its territory.¹²² Also, the political situation inside Turkey might force even a generally sympathetic regime in Ankara to resist America's using Turkey as a jump-off point, as has happened over Iraq.¹²³ Turkey's hesitancy to give full cooperation to coalition forces had a harmful effect on U.S. military planning and conducting the war in Iraq. The result was that the attacking allied forces really had no significant strategic reserve or maneuver force during the conflict.¹²⁴

New basing facilities should be more independent and better prepared to conduct emerging missions, such as anti-terrorism, infrastructure protection

¹¹⁹ Jim Garamone, "Defense Details Global Posture Realignment Process," *American Forces Information Service*, 23 June 2004; available from; http://www.dod.gov/news/Jun2004/n06232004_2004062303.html; Internet; accessed 22 December 2004.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Jack Spencer and John C. Hulsman, PhD, "Restructuring America's European Base Structure for the New Era."

¹²⁴ Ibid.

and when necessary, contraband interdiction.¹²⁵ Moreover, new bases should accelerate the Pentagon's ongoing transformation from stabile, industrial-age force into digital-age force. As demonstrated by the September 11 attacks that required a response in Afghanistan, it is very difficult to foresee where U.S. forces will be forced to fight next.¹²⁶

For that reason, present basing structure in Germany, dedicated to confront heavy, predicted forces from the East, is not sufficient. Flexible, smaller U.S. military bases in strategically important places in East Europe, maintained by domestic personnel, should be better prepared for future threats.

C. OPERATIONAL PRIORITIES

The United States should re-examine its present military base structure in Germany for operational reasons as well. Over the past decade or so, the Pentagon has felt increasingly constrained by training restrictions placed on the U.S. forces by their European host.¹²⁷ For example, training has become more difficult in Germany due to stringent environmental regulations. Germany has severely limited America's ability to fly helicopters at night, conduct live-fire exercises, and conduct training maneuvers in heavy, tracked vehicles.¹²⁸ Although these restrictions are understandable because of Germany's dense population and politically powerful environmental movement, they have forced the Pentagon to look elsewhere to train.¹²⁹

The effects of such limited training became clear during an operation in Kosovo, when U.S. Army attack helicopters based in Germany were sent to Albania.¹³⁰ Two of the 23 helicopters crashed, killing two U.S. soldiers, before

¹²⁵ Jack Spencer, "Principles for Restructuring America's Global Military Infrastructure," *The Heritage Foundation*, 16 August 2004; available from; [http://www.heritage.org/Research/National Security/wm554.cfm](http://www.heritage.org/Research/National%20Security/wm554.cfm); Internet; accessed 12 December 2004.

¹²⁶ Jack Spencer and John C. Hulsman, PhD, "Restructuring America's European Base Structure for the New Era."

¹²⁷ Vernon Loeb, "U.S. Looks Eastward in New NATO," *The Washington Post*, 28 May, 2002.

¹²⁸ Jack Spencer and John C. Hulsman, PhD, "Restructuring America's European Base Structure for the New Era."

¹²⁹ Vernon Loeb, "U.S. Looks Eastward in New NATO."

¹³⁰ Steven Komarrow, "Ex-Warsaw pact nations now key to U.S."

the team ever entered the fight.¹³¹ After analyzing the crashes, the Pentagon discovered that training was suffering because Germany, no longer fearing a Soviet attack, refused to tolerate the noise and pollution caused by Apache pilot training.¹³²

Bases in alternative, host countries with fewer environmental regulations could provide new training opportunities. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland offer a variety of terrains on which to train, from vast flatlands and swamps to the Baltic Sea and rugged mountains.¹³³

NATO countries have already been conducting military exercises in Eastern Europe since 1994.¹³⁴ For example, in February 2002, U.S. European Command decided to move its largest training exercise from Germany to Poland because German regulations put too many restrictions on the exercise for them to be optimally effective.¹³⁵ This training exercise, Victory Strike III, was the V Corp's biggest annual exercise, lasting three weeks and involving 5,000 U.S. soldiers.¹³⁶

These training opportunities not only help increase the readiness of U.S. forces, but also facilitate interoperability among allies.¹³⁷ The issue of interoperability between American forces and those of its allies should be of great concern and the more NATO allies train together, the better they will cooperate during a real conflict.¹³⁸ The war in Iraq proved that the success of any military coalition comes down to the ability of its members to work together.

NATO members and Eastern European nations have already cooperated during the conflict. Eastern European countries and Russia worked under American command during missions in Bosnia in 1995, nearly

¹³¹ Steven Komarrow, "Ex-Warsaw pact nations now key to U.S."

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Jack Spencer and John C. Hulsman, PhD, "Restructuring America's European Base Structure for the New Era."

¹³⁴ Steven Komarrow, "Ex-Warsaw pact nations now key to U.S."

¹³⁵ Jack Spencer and John C. Hulsman, PhD, "Restructuring America's European Base Structure for the New Era."

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

every Eastern European nation sends representatives to work with American National Guard units, and many of those same countries send top military officers to study in American military schools.¹³⁹

Most importantly, operational restructuring should help alleviate some of the manpower issues that currently hamper the force.¹⁴⁰ Decreased support requirements will free more troops for combat missions, and creating a base infrastructure abroad that reflects current U.S. national security priorities will promote efficient use of available resources.¹⁴¹

D. ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS

According to the *CRS Report for Congress*, the Department of Defense possessed, in aggregate, 24 percent excess installation capacity.¹⁴² It pointed out, however, that, "...only a comprehensive Base Realignment and Closure analysis can determine the exact nature and location of potential excess." ¹⁴³ It then went on to explain that the Department of Defense would conduct a careful review of its existing infrastructure in the coming year, ensuring that all installations will be treated equally and evaluated on their continuing military value to the nation.¹⁴⁴ U.S. military bases in Germany are the significant part of this excessive basing structure.

Redeploying bases from Germany eastward seems to be prohibitively expensive. Nevertheless, by establishing military bases of the new type, with smaller, rotational personnel in Eastern Europe, the U.S. would not incur the same sort of costs that it takes to build bases for soldiers and their relatives in more expensive parts of Europe.¹⁴⁵ The economical study of this project requires a feasible study authorized by Congress and the George W. Bush

¹³⁹ Jack Spencer and John C. Hulsman, PhD, "Restructuring America's European Base Structure for the New Era."

¹⁴⁰ Jack Spencer, "Principles for Restructuring America's Global Military Infrastructure."

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² David E. Lockwood, "Military Base Closures: Implementing the 2005 Round," *CRS Report for Congress*, RL32216, 9 December 2005, 8.

¹⁴³ David E. Lockwood, "Military Base Closures: Implementing the 2005 Round," *CRS Report for Congress*, RL32216, 4 January 2005, 8.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Jack Spencer and John C. Hulsman, PhD, "Restructuring America's European Base Structure for the New Era."

Administration.¹⁴⁶ This study should concentrate on economic considerations. However, while there are costs involved, the economic aspects should not prohibit such a move if it enhances overall American national security.¹⁴⁷

The United States already maintains an extensive base network in Germany. About 57,000 soldiers and 74,000 family members are now stationed in Germany.¹⁴⁸ Troops are stationed at these bases for periods of years rather than on a rotational basis like in the Balkans, where U.S. forces rotate in and out on six-month rotations.¹⁴⁹ Consequently, the U.S. Department of Defense needs to provide support services for entire families of troops presently stationed in Germany. For example, in Germany, the U.S. maintains 78 schools to educate the children of its troops.¹⁵⁰ Including the family housing areas, commissaries, schools and other support facilities, the U.S. Army serves as landlord to some 22,000 buildings and 239 installations across Europe.¹⁵¹

The spending necessary for the continuation of this policy is significant. Ramstein Air Base, the largest and strategically important U.S. base in Germany, costs about \$1 billion annually, an amount equal to Germany's yearly contribution toward the upkeep of U.S. bases.¹⁵² On average, the other 43 bases cost about \$240 million each, about the same as a single F/A-22 fighter jet.¹⁵³ Generally, base operations support is a significant line item in the Pentagon budget, accounting for a little over \$18 billion in 2003.¹⁵⁴

¹⁴⁶ Jack Spencer and John C. Hulsman, PhD, "Restructuring America's European Base Structure for the New Era."

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ David Josar, "Jones: Restructuring proposals for Europe bases aim for speed, agility", *Stars and Stripes*, 4 March 2003; available from <http://cndyorks.gn.apc.org/caab/articles/restructuringbases.htm>; Internet, accessed 25 December 2004.

¹⁴⁹ Jack Spencer and John C. Hulsman, PhD, "Restructuring America's European Base Structure for the New Era."

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ David Josar, "Jones: Restructuring proposals for Europe bases aim for speed, agility."

¹⁵² German Embassy Washington D.C., Fact Sheet: American Bases in Germany.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Jack Spencer and John C. Hulsman, PhD, "Restructuring America's European Base Structure for the New Era."

Instead of introducing a base restructuring plan, the United States still invests billions of dollars in new facilities in Germany. The U.S. Army is scheduled to begin construction soon on a \$692 million base in Grafenwoehr, Germany, for 3,500 soldiers and 5,000 dependents.¹⁵⁵ According to national security analysts, for the same expenditure, many smaller bases could be built in other places, such as in Eastern Europe.¹⁵⁶ As a parallel example of the cost involved, in Qatar, the United States recently built the world's largest store of pre-positioned Army equipment for only \$110 million.¹⁵⁷

From the one side, maintaining and modernizing the existing U.S. basing structure is justified. From the other side, however, investing precious resources into the old structure, unprepared to new threats, is questionable. Present American engagement into places like Afghanistan or Iraq, far away from existing permanent facilities could support this option.

On March 23, 2004, as a part of the budget justification required by Congress each year, the Secretary of Defense submitted a detailed report on the need for a further BRAC round.¹⁵⁸ He also certified that an additional round of closures and realignments would result in annual net savings for each of the military departments, beginning not later than in 2011.¹⁵⁹

The result of redeploying bases from Germany and introducing rotational deployment strategy is a much smaller infrastructure and fewer support facilities would be required.¹⁶⁰ As a result, the Pentagon could save significant resources by minimizing support infrastructure on U.S. bases in Germany. Savings from this project could be transferred into new, planned, basing facilities in other parts of Europe.

¹⁵⁵ Jack Spencer and John C. Hulsman, PhD, "Restructuring America's European Base Structure for the New Era."

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ David E. Lockwood, "Military Base Closures: Implementing the 2005 Round," 7.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Jack Spencer and John C. Hulsman, PhD, "Restructuring America's European Base Structure for the New Era."

IV. RESTRUCTURING THE U.S. MILITARY BASES IN GERMANY

A. U.S. BASES IN GERMANY ACCORDING TO BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE PROCESS

According to the U.S. Department of Defense, there were 97 major base closures and 55 major realignments during previous base restructure and closure actions in 1988, 1991, 1993 and 1995.¹⁶¹ Besides cutting unnecessary infrastructure, this Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process resulted in a net savings of \$16 billion through fiscal year 2001, and annually recurring savings of \$6 billion beyond then.¹⁶² The next BRAC round in 2005 will affect military bases in the U.S., as well as the basing structure overseas. One of the most important elements of the next BRAC round will be the U.S. military bases in Germany.

According to Raymond DuBois, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for installations and environment, "...there are (overseas) places where we have a concentration of troops basically as a legacy of the post-World War II situation between the Warsaw Pact and NATO."¹⁶³ The Cold War "has gone away," he asserted; therefore, there is no longer a need for having 70,000 U.S. troops in Germany.¹⁶⁴ The 2005 BRAC will reconfigure U.S. military infrastructure overseas to meet the realities of the 21st century.

The United States would have never won the Cold War if it had been unable to establish a credible presence in Western Europe. However, American forces in Germany, as well as the rest of the U.S. overseas military structure, are not prepared to meet the coming challenges of the digital era and America's European basing arrangements should reflect these objectives.

¹⁶¹ Gerry J. Gilmore, "Next BRAC Will Reflect Changing Times," *American Forces Information Service*, 14 July 2003; available from http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2003/n07142003_200307142.html; Internet; accessed 22 December 2004.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

On August 16, 2004, the George W. Bush Administration announced a proposal to considerably modify the U.S. overseas basing structure.¹⁶⁵ The proposal would establish new overseas operating sites, and transfer up to 70,000 U.S. troops, plus 100,000 family members and civilians, from Europe and Asia to the United States.¹⁶⁶ According to the Administration's proposal, up to 40,000 European-based U.S. troops, mostly from the Army, would be relocating to the continental United States (CONUS).¹⁶⁷ The Administration argues that present U.S. global basing arrangements are a product of World War II and the Korean War. A study by the Joint Chiefs in the late 1990s found that the United States has 20 percent to 25 percent more base capacity than is needed by the armed forces.¹⁶⁸ This base structure is still sapping precious resources of the U.S. Department of Defense.

With the end of the Cold War, these basing configurations need to be updated to guarantee that U.S. forces are optimally positioned to react to possible 21st century military threats. The issue for U.S. Congress is whether to approve, change, or reject the Bush Administration's proposal. Decisions would also considerably affect U.S. military capabilities, Department of Defense funding requirements, and the upcoming 2005 round of the Base Realignment and Closure process.¹⁶⁹

Implementing the Administration's proposal would bring the most significant redeploying of U.S. military troops overseas in about 50 years.¹⁷⁰ Most of the 40,000 troops would come from the 1st Infantry Division and 1st Armored Division, which are currently based in Germany.¹⁷¹

According to General B.B. Bell, a new Army Stryker brigade will be transferred to the Army's training center at Grafenwoehr, Germany, where

¹⁶⁵ Jon D. Klaus, "U.S. Military Overseas Basing: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress," *CRS Report for Congress*, RS21975, 17 November 2004, 1.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 2.

¹⁶⁸ Vince Crawley and William Matthews, "What next? What President Bush's win will mean to you?" *Navy Times*, 15 November 2004, 8.

¹⁶⁹ Jon D. Klaus, "U.S. Military Overseas Basing", 1.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 2.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*

new barracks and family housing were built.¹⁷² Army Stryker brigade will replace heavy divisions created to counterattack Soviet forces during the Cold War. The new brigade is equipped with Stryker armored vehicles, which are much lighter and quicker than the M1A1 Abrams tanks used by the divisions they will replace.

According to the *CRS Report for Congress*, in implementing the BRAC 2005 round, the Department of Defense must prepare a force structure plan based on an assessment of the probable threats to national security over a 20-year period, beginning with 2005.¹⁷³ The Secretary of Defense must also estimate the end-strength levels and the major military force units needed to meet such threats.¹⁷⁴ Moreover, he is required to conduct a comprehensive inventory of military installations and establish criteria for selecting bases for closure or realignment. Finally, he must address a broad range of military, fiscal, and environmental aspects likely to affect closure and realignment decisions.

The Administration's project has received mixed reaction from Congress and outside observers. For example, Michael O'Hanlon, of the *Brookings Institute*, expressed some concerns about the proposal, stating that DoD consultations with the State Department, Congress, and U.S. allies have been delayed and insufficient, allowing misperceptions about the proposal to grow.¹⁷⁵

From the other side, Lawrence Korb, of the *Center for American Progress*, stated that developing new global arrangements should be part of a general process for developing a national security strategy.¹⁷⁶ In most cases, he explained, it is less expensive to base troops overseas than in the United States, particularly when host countries like Germany guarantee some of the

¹⁷² Jon D. Klaus, "U.S. Military Overseas Basing", 2.

¹⁷³ David E. Lockwood, "Military Base Closures: Implementing the 2005 Round," 16 November 2004, 2.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

¹⁷⁵ Jon D. Klaus, "U.S. Military Overseas Basing", 4.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

costs involved, and that closing bases will not save money unless the troops serving overseas are demobilized.¹⁷⁷

Additionally, American soldiers serving overseas as a whole act as excellent ambassadors for the values that the U.S. is trying to promote around the world, and it is extremely important to ensure that closing bases be done in harmony with allies and host nations. According to *German Foreign Office*, from 1945, some 17 million Americans have served tours of duty in Germany.¹⁷⁸ Many return repeatedly as tourists. For this reason, the influence and perceptions of American soldiers towards Germany could not be ignored.

On September 23, 2004, at a hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said that the proposed redeploying of 70,000 troops back to CONUS would be completed over a period of six to eight years.¹⁷⁹

Donald Rumsfeld wasted no time after the 2004 presidential election, in launching the next major review of U.S. military strategy and hardware. Two days after election, Rumsfeld started to work on the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review, which military analysts believe could result in a major reordering of U.S. defense priorities.¹⁸⁰ Moreover, the Secretary of Defense set the phase for a massive round of U.S. base closings, with a new commission to start meeting early in 2005.

The election of the George W. Bush to a second term leaves him responsible for completing the restructuring of the U.S. military for the 21st century while fighting the war on terrorism and looking for a way to withdraw from Iraq. Redeploying American forces from Germany in the complicated political situation after the war in Iraq will be the most important challenge for the President.

The decision must be implemented, and it will be essential to ensure that any restructuring of American forces in Germany will be not seen as the reaction to Chancellor Schroeder's opposition to war with Iraq. While rifts

¹⁷⁷ Jon D. Klaus, "U.S. Military Overseas Basing", 4.

¹⁷⁸ German Embassy Washington D.C., Fact Sheet: American Bases in Germany.

¹⁷⁹ Jon D. Klaus, "U.S. Military Overseas Basing", 2.

¹⁸⁰ Vince Crawley and William Matthews, "What next? ", 8.

have emerged over the war, it will be important to confirm that the United States values its traditional alliances, especially with Germany, and that its realignment process will benefit all of Europe.

The situation in Iraq is also very important to the next BRAC round and to the future of American presence in Germany. Donald Rumsfeld came into office vowing to convert the U.S. armed forces into a force better able to take 21st century threats.¹⁸¹ However, he could not finish this process because of the complicated and tense situation in Iraq after the war. According to James Carafano from the *Heritage Foundation*, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld has to maintain an order in post-war Iraq, and then he will be able to shift his focus back to the transformation and redeploying troops from Germany.¹⁸²

B. THE IMPACT OF AN AMERICAN WITHDRAWAL ON THE GERMAN SOCIETY

The United States no longer needs to protect Western Europe from the immediate threat of thousands of Soviet tanks from the East. Nevertheless, it still envisions Europe, and in particular Germany, as an important part of the new political landscape and an important factor for global security.

Closure and realignment decisions will significantly change the present U.S. military structure in Germany and will be a key issue in the future relationship between the two countries. The next aspect for discussions between the two countries is the influence of American reorganization to the German society.

The presence of the U.S. troops in Germany for more than half a century has left an enduring mark on the local society. It is visible in the world of sports and entertainment, business, culture, and politics. However, as America shifts its strategic priorities, the U.S. military is not interested in keeping complex basing structures in Germany anymore.

Reducing or closing the operations at a military facility has an instant effect on the economy through reductions in spending and lost jobs. However, the economic pain of base closures is limited to the areas in which reductions actually happen. Though some communities with a high dependence on U.S.

¹⁸¹ Vince Crawley and William Matthews, "What next?", 8.

¹⁸² Ibid.

defense spending have not suffered at all because of the drawdown, this process could still be considered as the real menace.

According to the *Bonn International Center for Conversion* (BICC), the short-term consequences of U.S. withdrawal may be predicted and measured in three ways. First, more than 32,446 Germans have lost their jobs in U.S. bases since 1991 [1995 data].¹⁸³ Second, the United States has returned more than 92,000 acres of property.¹⁸⁴ To put it into perspective, this amount of land is almost the same size as the German federal state of Bremen, and is twice as large as the U.S. District of Columbia.¹⁸⁵ Third, the loss of more than \$3 billion in annual spending by the U.S. military in the German economy will adversely affect local retailers and contractors.¹⁸⁶

Several indicators may be used to evaluate the impact of U.S. withdrawal on the German economy. In their report from 1995, BICC revealed that the withdrawal process has already led to the loss of more than 150,000 authorized positions, including more than 35,000 German civilian positions, due to facility closures and reductions.¹⁸⁷ The restructuring process has also affected many communities, where the U.S. retains a significant presence. The extreme case is the Kaiserslautern Military Community, where almost 5,000 authorized positions were lost during the reorganization, even though none of its 18 individual facilities was completely closed.¹⁸⁸ Today, with more than 30,000 American residents, Kaiserslautern is still the largest American community outside of the U.S.¹⁸⁹

The city district and surrounding county of Kaiserslautern are especially vulnerable to any withdrawal of hosting U.S. installations because of an exceptional dependence on the economic activities of the Army and Air Force Bases. The complete withdrawal of U.S. troops from that area would have

¹⁸³ Keith B. Cunningham and Andreas Klemmer, "Restructuring the U.S. Military Bases in Germany, 6.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid. , 76.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ German Embassy Washington D.C., Fact Sheet: American Bases in Germany.

caused serious dislocations and problems for the local market and contractors. While such a worst-case scenario for the local economy did not materialize, in the course of base reorganization several of the main installations were reduced, eliminating thousands of authorized positions assigned to German civilians.¹⁹⁰

In addition to its direct employment effects, the drawdown has resulted in indirect employment effects, also severe to the local economy. BICC estimated that in total, during previous restructuring courses of action, 70,000 German jobs have been lost due to the U.S. withdrawal.¹⁹¹

In terms of spending effects, the demand of the American military community for goods and services in Germany has fallen by approximately \$3 billion since the beginning of the drawdown.¹⁹² This sum includes lost contracts spending, salaries of laid-off German civilians, and the loss of American military residents' consumption in the German economy.

The absolute figures of the local layoffs are not comprehensive indicators of the impact of U.S. military withdrawal on the local job market. The influence mostly depends of the structure of regional economy. In highly developed, urban areas, the labor market could provide enough job opportunities to absorb German workers displaced by the U.S. redeployment. For example, Mainz, a city in the highly industrialized and densely populated Rhein-Main area, suffered one of the largest layoffs and the U.S. withdrawal caused short-term economic problems. However, most of the laid-off workers either found new jobs or were compensated through a special joint American-German benefits package.¹⁹³

The completely different situation is in rural, underdeveloped areas without industry and other prospects than working in the large American military base. The German Counties hosting the Air Bases in Hahn and

¹⁹⁰ Keith B. Cunningham and Andreas Klemmer, "Restructuring the U.S. Military Bases in Germany, 35.

¹⁹¹ Ibid., 77.

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ Ibid., 29-30.

Bitburg demonstrated the link between the U.S. withdrawal and an almost instantly rising unemployment rate.¹⁹⁴

In the case of the Hahn Air Base, German government prepared the successful plan of the conversion. Realizing that U.S. reductions would occur after the end of the Cold War, Rhineland Palatinate analyzed the effect of an American withdrawal from the various Air Bases within the state as early as 1989.¹⁹⁵ From all the U.S. Air Bases in Rhineland Palatinate located in rural, undeveloped areas, the state's analysis showed that Hahn would be the easiest of the group to convert. In the months after the closure announcement, the state declared its intention to convert Hahn into a civilian airport. As the conversion effort began to gain momentum, Hahn Air Base successfully attracted 11 new companies to its facilities and demonstrated the possibility of effective conversion.¹⁹⁶

A different situation was observed in Bitburg. The economy of the county had been closely linked with the Bitburg Air Base. When the Air Force closed the base in 1994, it removed the district's chief employer.¹⁹⁷ Thousands of Americans left the area; a withdrawal felt painfully by their former German landlords. The lack of alternative job opportunities caused a temporarily, and sometimes lasting, dislocation of laid-off workers and contractors, who previously worked at the base.¹⁹⁸ With the virtual deactivation of the neighboring Sembach Air Base, Donnersberg County faced a similar situation, despite of the fact that the county's economy was far less dependent on the American troops.¹⁹⁹

Local officials' ability to replace those jobs by converting closed bases will depend on several important factors: the location, condition, and type of facility provided for closing. Nevertheless, human variables, such as the

¹⁹⁴ Keith B. Cunningham and Andreas Klemmer, "Restructuring the U.S. Military Bases in Germany," 30.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 68.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 69.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 35.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

attitude towards conversion, negotiating abilities, market familiarity, and even the creativity of local and state officials, is just as important.²⁰⁰

Locals are worried about the economic impact of an American restructuring, and consequently, a withdrawal. However, a nationwide poll showed 49 percent of Germans would welcome a further reduction of U.S. troops.²⁰¹ A little more than one quarter said they would regret such a move, while 18 percent said they had no opinion.²⁰² Foreign base closures are often viewed favorably in Germany. First, foreign bases have a tendency to employ foreigners, not Germans. Second, there is a high demand for development-ready land in German urban centers, and most of the U.S. Army's military communities are located near German city centers.²⁰³

However, the impact of troop withdrawals would hit some German communities hard. The Ramstein and Spangdahlem air bases, the largest U.S. military communities outside the U.S. are home to 40,000 American soldiers and relatives.²⁰⁴ Around 6,000 Germans are employed there.²⁰⁵ An economical study by the University of Trier concluded that the bases contributed 1.4 billion Euro to the local economy in 2001, supporting some 27,000 full time jobs in a region with few other economic possibilities.²⁰⁶

For the local citizens, this decision will affect not only the economy, but also the whole society. "If the U.S. troops were to leave on short notice, it would be a catastrophe", says Peter Grüssner, in charge of troop matters for Rhineland-Palatinate, the state in which bases are located.²⁰⁷

²⁰⁰ Keith B. Cunningham and Andreas Klemmer, "Restructuring the U.S. Military Bases in Germany," 2.

²⁰¹ William Boston, "Auf Wiedersehen, it's Been Good to Know You," *Time*, 24 March 2003 [journal on-line]; available from <http://www.time.com/time/europe/eu/daily/0,13716,436088,00.html>; Internet; accessed 21 December 2004.

²⁰² Ibid.

²⁰³ Keith B. Cunningham and Andreas Klemmer, "Restructuring the U.S. Military Bases in Germany," 6.

²⁰⁴ William Boston, "Auf Wiedersehen, It's Been Good to Know You."

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

If U.S. troops are to depart, many fear that German authority in world affairs will go with them. After World War II, Germany had great geopolitical significance. However, after the collapse of communism and the expansion of the European Union, this strategic significance no longer exists. For many Germans, U.S. military bases were their first exposure to American culture from the rock 'n' roll music to sports like basketball and baseball. "Every American soldier who was ever stationed here leaves with an impression of how we live our lives. And through the soldiers, we understand a little bit more about America," says Wiesbaden treasurer Mueller.²⁰⁸

In the report prepared by the *Bonn International Center for Conversion* in 1995, we could find some future consequences of redeploying U.S. forces from Germany. Despite of the fact that the U.S. withdrawal's effect on the German economy has been limited, the real loss of billions of dollars has seriously affected the communities most dependent on the U.S. military presence.

According to BICC, larger cities may create sufficient job opportunities to absorb Germans laid off because of the U.S. withdrawal. However, smaller communities with a higher dependence on U.S. spending may require successful base transformation to replace the jobs lost on the American bases.²⁰⁹ The BICC report could help in predicting the future outcome of redeploying the American troops from Germany, and in preparation, the necessary arrangements. Moreover, the report would help in dealing with the consequences of withdrawal for the society in both countries.

C. THE FUTURE MODEL OF U.S. MILITARY BASES IN EUROPE

In the post-Cold War period, when the U.S appeared to have no equal competitors, and even more in the post-9/11 world where the battlefield appears to have no boundaries, senior defense planners have had to assume that surprise is the norm rather than threat-based force.²¹⁰

²⁰⁸ William Boston, "Auf Wiedersehen, it's Been Good to Know You."

²⁰⁹ Keith B. Cunningham and Andreas Klemmer, "Restructuring the U.S. Military Bases in Germany," 77.

²¹⁰ Office of Force Transformation, "*Elements of Defense Transformation*" [journal on line]; available from http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_383_ElementsOfTransformation_LR.pdf; Internet; accessed 27 December 2004.

New American defense strategy requires agile, network-centric forces that can take action from forward positions, rapidly reinforce from other areas, and defeat adversaries swiftly and decisively.²¹¹ Speed will be crucial in future conflict. U.S. troops and their equipment must deploy to the trouble spot as quickly as possible. Defense officials have said a small number of troops in a hot spot can often quickly head off a problem before it escalates.²¹² “We are not focused on maintaining numbers of troops overseas; instead we are focused on increasing the capabilities of our forces and those of our friends,” Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas J. Faith pointed out.²¹³

According to General James Jones, Commander of U.S. European Command and Supreme Allied Commander Europe, the changes contemplated to the U.S. military posture in Europe will help strengthen the North Atlantic alliance and prepare the American military for the missions of the 21st century.²¹⁴ The shifts will mean fewer soldiers in Europe, however those that remain will be more agile and more lethal. Expeditionary forces that will rotate in and out of the area will increase U.S. military potential remaining in the theater. The timetable for the changes will depend on the changes recommended by the U.S. Base Realignment and Closure Commission.²¹⁵

After transferring from Germany, the U.S. military bases in Europe will be completely different. The new bases have to be ready to respond new, unpredictable threats, their location should reflect proximity to the future conflict’s areas, and their maintenance should be limited to basic operational

²¹¹ Office of Force Transformation, “*Elements of Defense Transformation.*”

²¹² Jim Garamone, “Officials Discuss Global Posture Process,” *American Forces Information Service*, 9 June 2004; available from http://www.dod.gov/news/Jun2004/n06092004_200406097.html; Internet; accessed 22 December 2004.

²¹³ Department of Defense, “*Prepared Statement before the House Armed Services Committee,*” 23 June 2004; available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2004/sp20040623-0522.html>; Internet; accessed 22 December 2004.

²¹⁴ Jim Garamone, “Jones Says Changes to U.S. Posture Will Strengthen Europe,” *American Forces Information Service*, 24 September 2004; available from http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2004/n09242004_2004092407.html; Internet; accessed 22 December 2004.

²¹⁵ Ibid.

needs without the necessity of creating a “little America” abroad. New, smaller bases will also foster the mobility and strategic agility of America’s forces.

If all goes as planned and everything about the reorganization of the forces in Europe would be done in consultation with allies, three types of U.S. bases in Europe will emerge. Main bases will be system hubs, such as Ramstein Air Base, Germany, Rota Naval Base, Spain, and facilities in Naples.²¹⁶ The Administration would then establish new secondary and tertiary facilities called forward operating sites and cooperative security locations in Europe and around the world.²¹⁷ In contrast to the main operating bases, which have permanently stationed troops and family dependents, forward operating sites and cooperative security locations will be maintained by a limited number of military staff.

In the forward operating site there will be a small number of Americans at the base permanently, however, the base could host continued operations quickly. Forward operating site will be the base kept “warm” by local nationals, contract employees, or a small cadre of service members. Forward operating sites could host a brigade but not support families, and be near an airport or seaport. Camp Bondsteel in Kosovo is an example of such a base: “We can simply turn on the lights and operate relatively quickly,” Jones said.²¹⁸

The third type of basing would be the cooperative security locations. This will be a bare bones base. A cooperative security location might have pre-positioned equipment or supplies, but no Americans permanently will be based there.²¹⁹ European Command is working with the State Department to negotiate access to areas. Jones said the command is building a catalog of bases that he hopes will “dot the landscape”.²²⁰ Special operations forces, Marines, or light infantry would use these bases.

²¹⁶ Jim Garamone, “Reduction Doesn’t Lessen U.S. Commitment to Europe,” *American Forces Information Service*, 6 October 2004; available from http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Oct2004/n10062004_2004100601.html; Internet; accessed 22 December 2004.

²¹⁷ Jon D. Klaus, “U.S. Military Overseas Basing,” 2.

²¹⁸ Jim Garamone, “Reduction Doesn’t Lessen U.S. Commitment to Europe.”

²¹⁹ Jim Garamone, “Jones Says Changes to U.S. Posture Will Strengthen Europe.”

²²⁰ Jim Garamone, “Reduction Doesn’t Lessen U.S. Commitment to Europe.”

Forward operating sites and cooperative security locations would host rotational forces and be a focus for bilateral and regional training. These locations would provide contingency access and be a crucial point for regional access. These new secondary and tertiary facilities would supplement main operating bases and help to facilitate the rapid deployment of U.S. forces to various parts of the world.

If the new bases are to be established, they should not be the sprawling complexes that dot the European landscape today. They should be smaller and more spartan.²²¹ Troops are stationed at America's European bases for periods of years rather than on a rotational basis as they are in the Balkans.²²² The result is that the U.S. government needs to provide support services for the families of most of the troops permanently stationed in Europe.

"I don't think that we will build the same kind of base that we built in the 20th century-complete with housing, schools, and hospitals-a mini-America in other countries," Gen. Jones told reporters in Stuttgart in March 2003.²²³ Jones cites forward operating site Camp Bondsteel in Kosovo as a new model: U.S. National Guard units are deployed there on six-month rotations, without dependents, which makes them more flexible and less costly.²²⁴ The changes "are not revolutionary. But evolutionary", he said.²²⁵ The transformation timetable is not set, Jones said, but the "embryonic" process that will decide how the U.S. military will look overseas will be completed in years, not decades.²²⁶

Heavy divisions currently stationed in Germany would be replaced with a Stryker brigade: lighter, smaller and easier to transport to the key regions. This kind of brigade, in the process of transformation and redeploying bases closer to the threat areas, would allow U.S. military to create more

²²¹ Jack Spencer and John C. Hulsman, PhD, "Restructuring America's European Base Structure for the New Era."

²²² Ibid.

²²³ David Josar, "Jones: Restructuring proposals for Europe bases aim for speed, agility."

²²⁴ William Boston, "Auf Wiedersehen, it's Been Good to Know You."

²²⁵ David Josar, "Jones: Restructuring proposals for Europe bases aim for speed, agility."

²²⁶ Ibid.

expeditionary, agile, and lethal force. Moreover, U.S. military with lighter brigades would be more capable of employing operational maneuvers and precision effects capabilities to achieve victory. Jones said technological improvements now enable a company of infantry soldiers in the 21st century to do what a battalion of soldiers did in the 20th century, and headquarters elements do not need to be so large.²²⁷ Any new base structure would be defined by “light ability, mobility [and] sustainability”, he said.²²⁸

In light of the enlargement of the NATO alliance that is growing eastward, it is logical that the U.S. Armed Forces will more fully engage new allies in military exercises and operations to increase readiness and strengthen interoperability. The U.S. should apply the newest century technology, institutional reforms and operation concepts to develop past century European basing strategy. Expeditionary basing, with reduced infrastructure, is an example of the future, more flexible, effective and efficient operating forces. According to the U.S. European Command, expeditionary basing will be a confrontation of agile versus permanent, and will be the result of cooperation and hard work with allies in a new political landscape in Europe.²²⁹ NATO pushes eastward, and this should be the new destination for U.S. military bases in the future.

American soldiers should also be in places from which they can deploy. For example, U.S. troops in Europe that deployed to Iraq ended up taking the long way around when Austria denied permission to cross its territory.²³⁰ “We believe it makes sense to work out arrangements with countries that are interested in the presence of the U.S. and which are in closer proximity to the

²²⁷ David Josar, “Jones: Restructuring proposals for Europe bases aim for speed, agility.”

²²⁸ Ibid.

²²⁹ *U.S. European Command Transformation* [database on-line], available from http://www.eucom.mil/Directorates/ECPA/Events/Transformation/Transform_Blue.htm; Internet, accessed 22 December 2004.

²³⁰ Jim Garamone, “Rumsfeld, Myers Discuss Military Global Posture,” *American Forces Information Service*, 23 September 2004; available from http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2004/n09232004_2004092311.html; Internet; accessed 22 December 2004.

regions of the world where our troops are more likely to be needed in the future,” Donald Rumsfeld pointed out.²³¹

Gen. Jones said that as he visits each NATO country in the upcoming months, he would discuss the idea of creating U.S. bases in Europe that can deploy troops faster and will be easier to operate than the current configuration.²³² “We have made some recommendations as to how we might proceed with regard to the types of presence that we might be able to implement in Eastern Europe,” he said; “these are very attractive to us.”²³³ According to Gen. Jones, bases in the East would be expeditionary type bases, not the main operating ones.²³⁴

Joint Chiefs Chairman, Air Force Gen. Richard B. Myers, during the press conference in June 2004, said no final decision has been made regarding the basing of U.S. forces in Germany.²³⁵ “There are programming issues, there are budgeting issues, there are issues of where forces may go back in the United States,” Myers said.²³⁶ According to Gen. Myers:

It is a very complex process, lots of moving parts...We want to make sure that the way we are postured in the future is where U.S. forces are wanted...We want to make sure of the usability of these forces in time of crisis-that we can use them where we need to use them.²³⁷

According to the *CRS Report for Congress* (November 17, 2004), U.S. officials have reportedly held talks with Poland, Romania and Bulgaria to create new operating sites after redeploying troops from the Germany.²³⁸

²³¹ Jim Garamone, “Rumsfeld, Myers Discuss Military Global Posture.”

²³² David Josar, “Jones: Restructuring proposals for Europe bases aim for speed, agility.”

²³³ Jim Garamone, “Jones Says Changes to U.S. Posture Will Strengthen Europe.”

²³⁴ Ibid.

²³⁵ Jim Garamone, “Myers: No Final Decision Yet on U.S. Posture in Germany,” *American Forces Information Service*, 7 June 2004; available from http://www.dod.gov/news/Jun2004/n06072004_200406072.html; Internet; accessed 22 December 2004.

²³⁶ Jim Garamone, “Myers: No Final Decision Yet on U.S. Posture in Germany.”

²³⁷ Ibid.

²³⁸ Jon D. Klaus, “U.S. Military Overseas Basing,” 2.

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V. CONCLUSIONS

In the new political situation in Europe, when the Cold War is no longer a threat, American base structure in Germany should be reconsidered. It will be a painful and serious decision for both sides of the Atlantic, but nevertheless, necessary in different political configuration.

After NATO and European Union enlargement, the security issues in the European continent look differently than few years ago. Germany is encircled by both NATO and European Union member-states. For the United States, Germany is no longer the borderline between two hostile powers. Nowadays, the widespread U.S. base structure on German soil created to confront the large, predictable enemy from the East becomes a heavy burden for the Department of Defense. The necessity of maintaining the whole system of bases in Germany, together with housing facilities for thousands of U.S. soldiers and their families, is questionable in a new political environment.

The tragedy of September 11 revealed that the present extensive U.S. basing structure all around the world is inefficient in the hour of need. The war on terrorism required the transfer of American troops from bases located in the heart of Germany into such unexpected places like Afghanistan or Iraq. For these reasons, U.S. base structure should be more flexible and more mobile.

In 2004 and 2005 the United States has conducted military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and simultaneously has invested millions of dollars in the preservation of extensive base networks overseas. The call for increasing the number of troops in Iraq coincided with the efforts of U.S. Department of Defense for decreasing the extensive military structure overseas. U.S. defense authorities realized that expenditures for the basing infrastructure in Europe were sapping precious resources that should be intended for military actions.

Moreover, in many bases in Germany, there are thousands of inactive soldiers far from the battlefield. The redeployment of American troops from

basing facilities in the heart of Europe into the areas of present military operations should help in achieving the military and political aims during the war on terrorism. It should also facilitate U.S. military to achieve strategic effects without asking for support from the international community.

The realignment of the present American military structure in Germany has to be closely connected with the process of transformation of the entire U.S. Armed Forces. The present American base system in Germany is a heritage of 20th century threats and has to be changed to meet upcoming, unpredictable challenges of 21st century. The Cold War military era, based on thousands of troops with tanks and heavy equipment, is finished. In the digital era, small units equipped with light vehicles and weapons that are easy to transport and deploy will dominate.

In regard to political, strategic, operational and economical considerations, the realignment and closure process of the existing U.S. base structure in Germany is justified.

From the political point of view, American-German relations are becoming more complicated. German government has different perceptions of international security and the role of United States in the world. Aggressive American policy is being criticized by German politicians and public opinion. U.S. military action in Iraq is seen in Berlin as unnecessary and troublemaking. The German government even tried to hamper preparations for war in Iraq, and it was the serious threat for the whole operation. For this reason, the United States should draw a political conclusion towards future relations with Germany.

In regard to the strategic point of view, the area of American interests was changed from Germany into other parts of the world, like the Middle East, Central Asia and North Africa. Therefore, the relocation of the present base structure in Germany seems to be necessary.

After analyzing the operational priorities, military training in Germany became more difficult because of rigorous environmental regulations.

However, in Eastern Europe there are plenty of interesting training facilities for American troops with much more liberal environmental regulations.

From the economic point of view, pumping the billions of dollars into the existing wide military structure in Germany seems to be thriftless. After realignment and closing part of the existing military structure, future savings can be used for the construction of basing facilities in other parts of the world that are important to the United States,.

In the process of transferring the American troops from Germany into other parts of the continent, U.S. defense analysts should consider new challenges in Eastern Europe. The new destinations should fulfill the high requirements for the U.S. military. In Eastern Europe, American forces could find the variety of terrains to train in, friendly democratic governments supporting U.S. policy, and already prepared and improved basing facilities. In this part of Europe, American soldiers will be also in closer geographical proximity to potential threats.

It should also be part of the new American strategy in leading to closer cooperation with those European countries that already proved their reliability and expressed the will to tighten bilateral contacts with United States.

The consistent support of Eastern European countries for the U.S. policy in Iraq, and in the meantime strong criticism from Germany and France was a political test for American policymakers. The stronger cooperation with countries of Eastern Europe could be the political counterbalance for American opponents on the international arena. The United States should take advantage of this phenomenon.

A. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

The United States military presence in Europe is still vital to promote American values and foreign policy. However, the future shape of American military structure in Europe will be designed to confront new, unpredictable threats, like terrorism or ethnical conflicts. That is the main reason for the adjustment of the present U.S. basing structure according to the aims of American foreign policy in the future.

Although future areas of operations are difficult to predict, there are still many potential sources of conflict in Europe and other places in the world. In Europe, the situation in Kosovo is still tense and turbulent. The fragile situation in the Middle East, with still unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Iran nuclear experiments, will demand the increasing presence of American soldiers. The hunger and political instability in North Africa would require peacekeeping actions on the large scale. Therefore, the American basing facilities in the future should reflect these realities.

According to U.S. Department of Defense and military analysts, after realignment, future American bases in Europe will be completely different than the existing ones. Smaller and more agile, they will be operated by rotational U.S. military personnel without families. Light brigades stationed in these bases, equipped with the weapons and vehicles easy to transport, will be lighter but more lethal. During peacetime, new operational sites will be maintained by locals, while during emergency time, new bases will be quickly developed into fully functional places. The disposure of new bases in different parts of Europe, closer to potential areas of operation, will reduce response time and make easier transport and logistics for field units.

It is almost certain that American military withdrawal will impact the German economy and society hard. The closing of several large bases with thousands of local workers and contractors is equivalent with higher unemployment scale in many German counties with limited job opportunities. The reduction of American spending and demand for goods would be the serious problem for local German communities, small business and local landlords.

Additionally, the withdrawing of American Forces would mark the end of the certain era for the German society. U.S. bases, since the end of the World War II, were present on German soil and guaranteed the peace and stability for recovering the post-war state. During the Cold War, with the American military and support, Germany was the important political actor on the international arena. Nowadays, many Germans are afraid that with U.S. redeployment in the future, German importance in the world will weaken.

In the name of good and productive relations in the future, the United States should assure the German government that the drawdown is a part of the American strategy, and is not punishment for the German opposition during the war in Iraq. In addition, the U.S. government should prepare public relations action explaining the process of withdrawal and direct it strictly to German society. German citizens should be aware that this decision is necessary in the new political situation, and is part of the transformation process of the U.S. Armed Forces.

To lessen any potentially negative impact of American redeployment to the German economy, successful plans of conversion should be prepared. This is a complicated and multilateral problem, and requires detailed and bilateral cooperation. At the same time, the U.S. Department of Defense should prepare appropriate plans for using the redeployed American troops in other places important for national security.

Restructuring of the existing U.S. military structure in Germany was already officially announced by the highest U.S. officials as a part of the next round of the Base Realignment and Closure process. According to *CRS Report for Congress* from March 21, 2005, work of the closure and realignment Commission must be completed by April 15, 2006.²³⁹

The final decision is expected soon and should be preceded by a careful and detailed study prepared by the U.S. Department of Defense with consultation of the German government. It is possible to predict future consequences of American withdrawal, and to make necessary arrangements.

²³⁹ Daniel H. Else and David E. Lockwood, "Military Base Closures: The 2005 BRAC Commission," *CRS Report for Congress*, RS22061, 21 March 2005, 6.

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